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CAPTIVE AUDIENCES, CHILDREN AND THE
INTERNET

William D. Araiza*

Recent judicial decisions striking down laws regulating Internet content in
order to protect children have drawn praise from civil libertarians.' It is easy to
understand why: the Internet possesses several characteristics that make it a
particularly valuable communications medium, while lacking other
characteristics that have, in the past, justified government regulation. For
example, the lack of technical limitations on the number of speakers obviates
the need for government regulation designed to ensure that a diversity of views
get aired. Instead, the Internet is a forum for an extraordinarily diverse set of
viewpoints. Indeed, the ease and relative low cost of logging on and posting
content, for example, by creating a webpage or participating in a chat room,
largely obviates even the economic scarcity the United States Supreme Court
has acknowledged in the context of newspaper publishing.2 On the listener's
side, content on the Internet normally is not encountered by accident; at the
very least, the risk of an unpleasant surprise is smaller than in the broadcasting
context. All told, the Internet is a radically new medium which promises
greatly expanded opportunities for widespread interactive communication
between people, much more so than the one directional speech of broadcasting,
cable, or print media. Given a medium like this, a rule against government
interference seems appropriate, and welcome.
Ironically, though, the extraordinary usefulness of the Internet suggests a
potential reason for its regulation. As the Internet reveals its communicative
potential, it becomes possible to argue that it needs to be regulated in order to
make its benefits more widely available. This is especially true when such

* Professor of Law and Richard A. Vachon, S.J., Fellow, Loyola Law School (Los
Angeles), Loyola Marymount University.
1See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002); Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844 (1997); Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002),
prob.juris. noted, 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002); Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs., 24 F. Supp. 2d
552 (E.D. Va. 1998).
2 See generallyMiami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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regulation is promoted on the grounds of protecting children, who might be
thought to suffer more than adults from inappropriate speech, even when the
child turns away from that speech after the initial unwelcome exposure. If such
unwelcome exposures lead would-be users to abstain from Internet usage, there
will be a significant loss of the benefits of free speech, exactly because the
medium could otherwise be so useful.
The Internet, like broadcasting, can also be characterized as a medium that
intrudes into the home. While this is hardly a foregone conclusion - Internet
use, like radio listening, can occur outside the home as well - the Internet has
the capacity to intrude into the home in a way that other types of speech, such
as political rallies and even leafletting, do not. As such, the Internet3 shares at
least some similarities to broadcasting, in terms of its intrusiveness.
Intersecting with these ideas of intrusiveness, the home, and children's
protection is the right of parents to control what their children may see. When
impaired by the government, the Court has found a constitutional dimension to5
4
that right, dating back to Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society ofSisters.
Conversely, the Court has demonstrated its respect for the concept of parental
authority by acknowledging that it can justify speech restrictions designed to
augment parents'6..
ultimate ability to control their children's access to potentially
harmful speech. By such laws the government, in effect, offers to babysit,
allowing the parent to know that the child is getting the benefit of access to
information while not running the risk of encountering inappropriate
information. As the Court stated in Ginsberg v. New York, "The legislature
could properly conclude that parents.., who have [the] primary responsibility
for children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid
discharge of that responsibility." 7 If that interest was enough to justify, in
Ginsberg,a restriction on the sale of pornography to children, presumably it is
powerful enough to warrant at least some judicial deference when government

3 Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).

4 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

' 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

6See, e.g., Ginsberg v. N.Y., 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968). Slightly further afield, but not
completely off the point, is Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), where the Court held that
Amish parents could not be compelled to send their children to a certain level of state-provided
schooling, due to the impact such a requirement would have on the parents' Free Exercise
Clause rights and rights to raise their children in a particular religious tradition.
7390 U.S. at 639 (1968).
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attempfts to restrict children's speech in aid of parental control in the home
itself.
There is, of course, an alternative to government assisting parental control
in the home by limiting what a child might find online or on the radio. The
government could simply warn the parent that she has the obligation to turn the
computer off. After all, logging on to the Internet requires an affirmative step
that a parent need not allow the child to take, as Justice Brennan argued in FCC
v. PacificaFoundationwith regard to radio broadcasts. 9 Still, keeping a child
from logging on to the Internet in order to protect him from unsuitable speech,
just like keeping a child from turning on a radio, exacts real costs in terms of
the child's loss of access to information.
This Article provides a very brief review of arguments for regulation of
Internet content in pursuit of child welfare, in order to determine whether such
regulation - normally, and, in the author's view rightly, presumed to be
constitutionally problematic - can be defended. In order to do so, it posits the
intersection of three distinct concepts all pointing in the direction of regulation:
the pervasiveness of the medium, the presence of children, and the costs that
are incurred when a parent prevents a child from accessing the Internet for fear
of the child encountering offensive speech. It assumes Internet use in the
home, where privacy interests may be at their peak,' ° and thus assumes away
the sizable problem of Internet use in public libraries, where libraries' provision
of Internet services arguably creates a public forum within which government
may be especially limited in making content-based restrictions."
In discussing the pervasiveness of the medium, the Article asks, in Part I,
whether the Internet's character justifies application of a principle akin to the
captive audience doctrine. It argues that a principle akin to the captive
audience doctrine could theoretically be used to justify Internet regulation,
although the breadth such a theory would need is enough to give one pause.
Part II considers the special needs of children, and how those needs can be

8 Compare id. (noting that the restriction allowed parents to purchase pornographic
magazines for their children), with Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,865 (1997) (striking down the
Communications Decency Act in part because "neither the parents' consent - nor even their
participation - in the [offensive] communication would avoid the application of the statute").
9 See 438 U.S. at 764-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1oSee id. at 748 (plurality opinion) (noting the importance of the fact that radio intrudes
into the home in determining the level of permissible government regulation).
" CompareAm. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 409 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(discussing libraries' provision of Internet services as creating a public forum); with Mainstream
Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs., 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 562-63 (E.D. Va. 1998) (discussing the same).
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accommodated in a regime of Internet regulation. It also considers the loss of
benefits normally accruing from free speech when the lack of regulation leads
individuals to keep their children away from the Internet. It concludes that
while these losses may be real, and their minimization a legitimate government
interest, a regime of content-based restrictions may be worse than the disease.
Ultimately, private filtering, in this case by parents, may be the only
constitutionally acceptable method of balancing the Internet's usefulness with
whatever harm it could cause.

I. THE INTERNET AND SPEECH
A. How Can the Audience Be Captive?
At the outset it is fair to ask how captive audience doctrine can even
possibly apply to a situation like Internet usage given the fact that the audience
for Internet speech takes the affirmative step of logging on. By contrast,
captive audience doctrine posits a situation in which the listener has no choice
but to hear the undesired speech. This lack of choice has a strong spatial
component to it; indeed, the classic example of a captive audience being the
target of residential picketing. 12 Such cases have led commentators to
characterize the captive audience doctrine as one essentially aimed at the
home.' 3
However, even at the outset, it is important to note that this spatial
component is not the sum total of the doctrine. Nobody would suggest that
government has the right to censor a newspaper's content in order to protect the
tranquility of the subscriber, even though the subscriber picks up her paper
from the front lawn and reads it in her kitchen. Perhaps more realistically, nor
can government censor the mail in order to protect an unsuspecting recipient of
offensive matter. For example, in Bolger v. Young's Drug ProductsCo., 1
Court struck down an ordinance prohibiting the mail delivery of contraceptive
advertisements to residential customers even in the absence of a recipient's

12 See,

e.g., Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1988); Martin v. Struthers; 319 U.S.

141 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
13 See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 85, 90 (1991); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 845 (1997).
14463

U.S. 60 (1983).
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request, despite the possibility that some recipients would find such
advertisements offensive. 5
Thus, concern for spatial privacy interests, while certainly important in
understanding the Court's solicitude for captive audiences, fails to account for
situations where a physical residence is not an absolutely protected enclave.
This conclusion makes intuitive sense. Privacy is important not because it is an
objective good to be protected regardless of the home dweller's wishes or
actions, but because it preserves a sphere to which the individual can retreat if
she so wishes. Thus, in the newspaper example above, the dweller's decision to
subscribe, and to pick the newspaper up and read it in her kitchen, represents
her decision to bring the world into her home. The dweller herself has decided
to re-enter the world, even if only figuratively; she has no right to demand that
the world be presented to her in a way she would find pleasant or nonoffensive. The same could be said for mail delivery; by picking up and reading
her mail the home 16dweller is again opening herself up to communication from
the outside world.
At the other extreme, the Court, or individual justices, has sometimes
suggested that the privacy concerns implicit in captive audience doctrine extend
beyond the home. Indeed, the first use of the term "captive audience" in a
Supreme Court opinion was in a 1951 dissent by Justice Jackson, in a case
dealing with offensive speech on a public street. 17 The following year, in
Public Utilities Commission v. Pollack,18 Justice Douglas used the term to
describe passengers subjected to piped-in music, on a government-operated

15But see Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (upholding a ban
on delivery of offensive mail when the recipient specifically requested such controls).
16This idea is consistent with the result in Rowan, id., in which the Court upheld a statute
allowing individuals to specify to the Postmaster General certain mailing they did not wish to
receive. As one commentator noted, this statute still requires the recipient to re-enter the world,
even if only to delegate to an agent (the mail service) the task of throwing out unwanted mail.
See Strauss, supra note 13, at 91. Clearly, this is not a heavy burden on the mail recipient, as
she need never actually see the mail she is rejecting. On the other hand, the minor burden of
specifying the type of mail she wants rejected nevertheless involves the individual in culling the
offensive from the acceptable, even if at a distance.
For roughly analogous examples of the Court finding privacy interests less compelling
in situations where the unwilling listener has otherwise opened his property up to the public,
see, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company town), and Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (organization with broad membership).
17Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295, 298 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
" 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952).
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streetcar. 19 For Justice Douglas, the operative fact was obviously not that the
music intruded into people's homes, but that it was present in a context - public
transportation - that he later described as "an association.., compelled by the
facts of life." 20 In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 21 a plurality of the Court,
joined by Justice Douglas to form a majority, similarly described the passengers
of a streetcar as a "captive audience. 2 2
Justice Douglas' concern is easy to understand: we are all, every day,
"captive" in all sorts of contexts going well beyond the classic example of a
home dweller subjected to a residential picket. Since I drive to my office every
weekday morning I necessarily have to see what is going on around me. I am,
in that sense, "captive" to graffiti on the street, offensive gestures people make
and whatever else I see. To say that I could avert my eyes, take another route,
move closer to my office or simply telecommute, seems by itself an insufficient
answer to my claim of captivity. After all, an analogous answer could be given
to the target of the residential picketing: the target could install sound proof
windows, close her shades, move to another community, or take a sleeping pill
so she would not be conscious during the protest.
The label "captive audience" thus reflects a value judgment that certain
interests, which commentators often identify as privacy and autonomy,23 are
worth protecting in some contexts, even at the cost of suppressing speech. The
importance society accords the home as a place for reflection and refuge for the
world therefore justifies applying a doctrine to many, though not all, situations
where unwanted speech intrudes into the home.24 For Justice Douglas, the fact
that commuters on a streetcar had no realistic transportation alternative made
them captives as well. Analogously, some defenders of sexual harassment law
argue that employees should not be forced to leave a job in order to avoid
speech that, by creating a hostile working environment, constitutes employment
discrimination.2 5
On the other side of the balance, if the scope of First Amendment
protection accorded speech requires the Court to make value judgments about

'9See id. at 468.
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 776 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
2 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion).
22 See id. at 302, 304; see also id. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring).
23 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 13, at 108.
24 See, e.g., Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988).
25
See, e.g., Jack Balkin, Free Speech andHostile Environments,99 COLUM. L. REv. 2295,
20

2312 (1999).
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"captivity," it may also involve the Court making judgments about the nature of
the unwanted speech. In Pollak, for example, Justice Douglas was especially
concerned that the speech was government-sponsored (music piped in by the
government-owned utility), and thus created the risk of government
indoctrination. Indeed, he conceded that a passenger on a streetcar had no right
to complain about other passengers' speech; the unacceptable invasion, he
thought, occurred when it was government doing the speaking.26 Similarly, the
Lehman plurality expressed concern that allowing political advertisements on
the streetcar would give rise to public suspicions of favoritism. 27 At least one
defender of sexual harassment law suggests that political speech by employees
be exempted as a basis for hostile environment liability, given the importance
of such speech and its marginal role in creating such environments.28
This analysis implies another important point: the captive audience
determination not only extends potentially beyond the home, but, more
fundamentally, is not place-specific. One might be deemed a captive to a
residential picket but not to offensive mail sent to one's home.29 One might be
deemed3 a captive to government speech in a streetcar, but not to private
speech. 0 One might be deemed a captive to non-political speech in the
workplace, but not political speech.' One might even be a captive audience
to
32
workplace harassment speech when one is not in the workplace itself.
In sum, the term "captive audience" is not self defining. Rather,
determining that someone is a captive in certain situations in a home, a
streetcar, a workplace or a classroom 33 simply reflects a judgment that, in such
a context, that person should not be compelled to listen to certain undesired

26 See Pollak, 343 U.S. at 468-69.
27 See Lehman,

418 U.S. at 304. Additionally, in Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,478

U.S. 675, 684-85 (1986), the Court upheld a school's punishment of a student for giving a
sexually suggestive speech in front of an assembly the Court characterized as a captive audience,
based largely on the inappropriate nature of the speech in such a setting, where pedagogical
interests were so important. Compare id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment)
("Respondent's speech may well have been protected had he given it in school but under
different circumstances, where the school's legitimate interests in teaching and maintaining civil
public discourse were less weighty.").
28 See Balkin, supra note 25, at 2315.
29 Compare Frisby, 487 U.S. 474, with Bolger v. Young's Drug Prods. Co., 463 U.S. 60
(1983).
30 See Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
31See Balkin, supra note 25, at 2315.
32
See id. at 2313.
33 See supra note 28.
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speech. At the very least, in such a situation free speech rights should not stand
as an absolute bar to government's discretion to decide to favor the unwilling
listener over the unpleasant speaker.
The reasons to favor a listener require examination.
B. Balancing the Speech Interests
Given this understanding of the captive audience doctrine, we are now
better positioned to examine the ramifications of regulating content on the
Internet, when such regulation is based both on the Internet's character and on a
concern for children. One argument is that the Internet is so useful that its use
should be encouraged by sanitizing it, even at the cost of suppressing speech.
In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, the government attempted to defend
the Communications Decency Act ("CDA") in part by arguing that the CDA
was designed to encourage use of the Internet by ensuring that inappropriate
speech was cordoned off from children. 4 Such an "encourage the listener"
theory does not usually arise in captive audience doctrine, which normally
presupposes speech occurring that the captive does not want to hear, in a
context where the captive is forced to listen. But in the case of the Internet, it
could be argued that the inability to filter out undesirable speech creates an
unacceptable dilemma for a would-be user: use the Internet and subject yourself
to the risk of encountering such speech, or abstain altogether from using the
medium.
By analogy, defenders of sexual harassment law argue that employees'
need to earn a living makes the workplace a context where an employee should
not be forced to listen to undesired speech. 35 Justice Douglas suggested in
Pollack that the commuter's need to ride the streetcar to work makes it a place
where government should not have the right to pipe in government-selected
speech.36 The question then arises whether the Internet is sufficiently important
as a medium that a user - particularly a child - should not be put to the risk of
encountering inappropriate speech. The Internet differs from these other
examples, though, in that the interest in favor of regulating the speech is itself a
speech interest - i.e., the heightened attractiveness of a "cleaner" Internet as an

34521 U.S. 844, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997).
35 See, e.g., Balkin supra note 25, at 2312-13; Jessica Karner, PoliticalSpeech, Sexual

Harassmentanda Captive Workforce, 83 So. CAL. L. REv. 637, 682-83 (1995); Marcy Strauss,
Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1990).
36 343 U.S. at 468.
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information source. In other words, there are First Amendment interests on
both sides of the equation.
The Court in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union roundly rejected this
argument. 37 At the superficial level, the Court simply refused to believe that
there was any mass tuning out of the Internet when usage statistics, at the time,
indicated overall significant growth. 38 This reasoning is not particularly
persuasive. An overall trend toward increased use of the Internet says very
little about whether usage would have increased even more had there been
regulation of indecent speech. A more precise estimate of the tune-out effect
might, however, be exceedingly difficult to derive.
More profoundly, the Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union Court
invoked what it considered to be a long-standing presumption against
government regulation justified on this type of rationale. "As a matter of
constitutional tradition," the Court stated, "in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, we presume that governmental regulation of the content of speech 39
is
it."
encourage
to
than
ideas
of
exchange
free
the
with
interfere
to
likely
more
Legislative restrictions on corporate political speech and the FCC's adoption of
the fairness doctrine, versions of both of which the Court has upheld based on
analogous theories, 40 stand as potential counter-examples. But no matter. The
interesting thing about this statement is how cavalierly the Court makes it,
without any discussion or citation at that part of the opinion to the particular
characteristics of the medium. The Internet may well be a medium in which
such restrictions do in fact accomplish more interference with, than
encouragement of, the free exchange of ideas, but it is surely unpersuasive
simply to announce this as a general rule and then walk away. On the other
hand, there is perhaps good reason to begin with a presumption against
regulation based on this rationale, given the suspicion, always lurking in
government speech regulation, that such regulation is motivated by dislike of
the content.
More generally, perhaps the proper response is that government simply has
no business creating audiences for speech by sanitizing. The argument here is
that if some media included speech that was so undesirable as to drive away
listeners, that result would have to be accepted, or at least could not be altered

See 117 S. Ct. at 2351 (1997).
31 See id.
39 Id.
40
See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); Red Lion Broad.
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
17
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through government restriction of that undesired speech. Campaign speech
might be an exception to this principle, given the constitutional status of the
requirement that the political process be open to all on an equal basis. 4' The
fairness doctrine might also stand as an exception, given the problem of
spectrum scarcity and the fact that government plays a very different role with
regard to allocation of the broadcast spectrum than with how speech is made
with purely private means through a medium that does not suffer from
technology-based scarcity. 42 Beyond such exceptions, the Reno v. American
Civil Liberties Union Court's sweeping presumption may reflect a preference
for private choices by both speakers and listeners over a governmental
obligation to produce a particular quantity of speech.
A variant on this argument returns us to the concept of a captive audience.
It might be argued that the Internet is simply so necessary to daily life as to
justify regulation on the grounds that, just like Justice Douglas' streetcar, we
cannot live without it. While this sounds like an empirical question - exactly
how necessary is the Internet in our daily lives? - ultimately it is a value choice.
Is it so important that everyone feel comfortable logging on, that we would be
willing to suppress speech?
In attempting to explain the Court's citation of the "pervasiveness" of
broadcast media as a justification for regulating it, Jack Balkin offers the
suggestion that "there are significant cultural pressures to have a television set
and keep it in one's home.' 43 Obviously, there are important differences
between television and the Internet; for example, warnings about upcoming
offensive content are much less practicable on television or radio, as compared
with websites. 44 But for our purposes, the important point is that the cultural
pressure to allow a particular medium into a home could suffice to justify
calling the audience captive, even if the listener, technically, still has power
over the on/off switch.

41 See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 399-401 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); Austin, 494 U.S. 652.
42 CompareRed Lion, 395 U.S. 367, with Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.

241, 258 (1974) (striking down a right of reply requirement on newspapers).
43Jack Balkin, Media Filters,the V-Chip, and the FoundationsofBroadcastRegulation,
45 DuKE L.J. 1131, 1137 (1996) (suggesting this understanding of a medium's pervasiveness in
the context of television).
44 Seee.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (noting the difficulty of
warning potential listeners to a broadcast, given the fact that the audience is constantly tuning in
and out).
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Again recall the character of a home dweller "captive" to a residential
picket. The dweller always has the option of installing soundproof walls and
closing her curtains. We might call it unreasonable to impose such a
requirement on the picketing target. Is it unreasonable to require a radio
listener always to keep her radio off, to avoid hearing offensive speech? 45 Is it
unreasonable to force an employee to leave her job, to avoid a hostile working
environment based on gender? Is it unreasonable to force a would-be user not
to use the Internet to avoid encountering offensive speech?
The above arguments are cast at an extraordinarily high level of generality.
More needs to be said about the particular characteristics of the Internet and
the particular problems posed by children's use of it. The next Part considers
these factors in more detail.
II. DOES IT MATTER THAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT CHILDREN?

The Court has found that children can be treated differently from adults
across a broad range of topics, from denial of rights basic to adults (such as
marriage), to access to information and subjection to value inculcation by the
government. One justification for such differential treatment - a justification
pregnant with potential meaning for the issue discussed in this article - was
offered by Justice Stewart, concurring in Ginsbergv. New York's holding that a
child could be prohibited from buying sexually-oriented material that adults had
a constitutional right to obtain. 4 In justifying the differential treatment for
children and adults, Justice Stewart cited the "free trade in ideas" rationale for
free speech. Such free trade, he said, requires that listeners have the ability to
choose what to listen to. Choice, in turn, requires an ability to tune out
offensive speech, a view that, according to Justice Stewart, explained the
Court's captive audience doctrine. All this mattered to Justice Stewart's
concurrence in Ginsbergbecause he compared a child to a captive audience, in
that both were unable to choose to receive or reject certain speech, the captive
listener because of her captivity and the child because of his immaturity.
As suggested earlier, the intuition that Internet users are captive audiences
also has something to do with choice. 48 Captive audience theory reflects a

41 See id.
46 390 U.S. 629, 648-50 (1968).
41 See id.
48

See also, e.g., Strauss, supra note 13, at 108 (identifying individual choice, or autonomy,
as a justification for captive audience doctrine).
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concern that individuals subjected to certain speech, such as residential
picketing, had no choice, or at least no reasonable choice, as to whether to listen
to the speech. So too, users of the Internet may be put to a very difficult choice,
- use an extraordinarily powerful information medium, present in the home and
always beckoning,49 or leave. Similar pressures to use a medium, despite the
risk of encountering something unpleasant, underlay the Pacifica plurality's
discussion of radio as pervasive. 50 Pervasiveness, and thus pressure to listen to
the radio, might not be based on the invasion of radio broadcasting into the
physical space of the home, but instead on its ubiquitousness and attractiveness,
which arguably combine to render unreasonable a requirement that the wouldbe user abstain if she wants to avoid the undesired speech. 5'
Admittedly, these are different conceptions of choice. The choice Justice
Stewart speaks of is the maturity to decide whether to receive certain speech.
This situation posits the availability of the speech (e.g., an adult magazine on a
bookstore shelf), but also theoretically the complete discretion whether or not to
access it. (The discretion is described as theoretical because the entire point of
his analysis is that children may lack the maturity to consider the ramifications
of the choice, and thus in some sense do not have full decisional capacity.).
Sometimes this is also the choice in the Internet context, for example, when a
child decides whether to search for pornographic sites. Often, however, choice
in the Internet context is of a different sort. Many times, the choice is between
going online at all and running the risk of accidentally encountering offensive
speech, or abstaining from use entirely. It was this type of lack of choice that
was at issue in Pacifica: once one decides to use the radio, one has no choice
whether or not to receive offensive speech, since there is no effective way to
warn audiences of what they could expect from that broadcast.
These conceptions of choice are distinct, but both of them are present in the
context of children's use of the Internet. While the latter of these situations the one analogous to the facts in Pacifica - is most obviously tied to concerns
about a captive audience, the former is also relevant, assuming Justice Stewart's
broader understanding of the concept of captivity as incapacity to make a fully
informed decision. In short, we are dealing both with a medium whose power
and soon-to-be ubiquitousness make complete abstinence difficult, or at least an
unreasonable option, and with users who may not have the maturity to make the

49 See Balkin, supra note 43, at 1137.
50 See Pacifica,438 U.S. at 748.
51 At the very least, this reading of Pacifica accounts for the trivial but still relevant fact
that the listening in that case took place in a car, not a home.
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difficult choice between abstinence and possible exposure to the offending
material.5 2
The assumption that such use occurs in the home only strengthens the
argument, even if captive audiences are not exclusively defined by reference to
dwelling places. In this case, the location of the use is not as important for its
physical attributes as for the fact that the home is the physical locus for parental
authority. Parental authority over children enjoys constitutional stature,53 and
while the intrusion on that authority here does not emanate from government,
the importance of parental control has justified government in assisting parents
by, for example, restricting minors' independent access to everything from
sexually-explicit materials to abortions to secondary education. 54 So
understood, a restriction on children's access to offensive Internet speech could
be viewed as government assistance to parental control when a child is
otherwise "captive. ' 55
Finally, we can add to the mix the special harm that offensive or
inappropriate speech may have on children. It is reasonable to assume that
adults are better able than children to brush off confrontations with unpleasant
speech. Adults have a range of knowledge and experience that allows them
better to contextualize and evaluate speech they receive. Thus, not only are
children more "captive" than adults in the sense of not being as able to choose
to receive or reject certain speech, but they may also be harmed more by
unwanted speech that is in fact received.
Two objections to this analysis immediately come to mind. First, it is
ironic that the success of a medium in becoming ubiquitous opens it up to
government regulation. This argument returns us to the consequences of

52

Itshould be noted that this analysis assumes involuntary exposure to offensive speech on
the Internet. If a child seeks this information out, the choice is not involuntary.
53See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
54 See Hogsdon v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (upholding parental notification
requirement before a minor could obtain an abortion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); Ginsberg v. N.Y., 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); compare Reno v. ACLU, 532 U.S. 844,
865 (1997) (striking down the Communications Decency Act in part because "neither the
parents' consent - nor even their participation - in the [offensive] communication would avoid
application of the statute").
55Obviously, for such a statute to perform this function it would have to allow for parents
to override any access limitations imposed on their children if the parent determined the material
to be suitable, at least when the parent had control over his or her children (and thus not, say, in
a school environment). Compare Reno v. ACLU, 532 U.S. at 865.
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entering the (virtual) public square, and the importance of the government
interest in encouraging a larger audience in the square. Second, this analysis
assumes that the choice is between, on the one hand, complete abstinence from
Internet use and, on the other, use which necessarily exposes the user to the
possiblility of encountering offending material, either accidentally or on
purpose. The choice may not be as stark. This latter objection requires that we
consider the consequences of the Internet as a medium, in particular, the extent
to which it accommodates filtering by the user. Moreover, the availability of
privately-available filters raises the possibility that parental control - as noted
above, one of the prime interests regulation seeks to promote - can be more
precisely (and thus more effectively) promoted short of government control.
This article takes up these points in sequence.
A. Entering the (Virtual) Public Square

At first glance it seems perverse that a medium's very success at attracting
an audience should thereby make it a special target for government regulation.
But the captive audience idea - that a medium is fundamental to daily life, or so
ubiquitous as to be necessarily an intrusive presence in the home - suggests at
least the theoretical appropriateness of regulation, especially in the service of
ensuring its availability to all. It must be realized that there are costs when a
would-be Internet user abstains from logging on because of fear of
encountering offensive speech. Those costs may not themselves be of
constitutional stature; that is, a would-be listener probably does not have a
constitutional claim simply because the presence of offensive speech in a
particular forum prevents that person from entering.56 Still, there is a social
cost when an individual feels a need to abstain from acquiring information.
Indeed, in the service of ensuring that information is provided to some, the
Court has been willing to either uphold or apply less than strict scrutiny to
government action intruding on the speech rights of others.57 Thus, individuals
may not have First Amendment rights to compel government to provide

However, if the offending speech emanates from the government, then there may be a
constitutional claim that the individual has a constitutional right to be free of government
indoctrination. See generally Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 450, 467-68 (1952)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
57 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (imposing intermediate scrutiny
test for content-neutral restrictions on cable programming designed to protect financial viability
of broadcast industry, which was the only source of television programming for a substantial
minority of Americans); Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding fairness
doctrine).
56
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information, but a government policy to do so certainly qualifies as a legitimate
interest.
The only question, then, is whether that increase in speech can
appropriately be "bought" at the cost of content-based regulation. It is by no
means clear that it can. Most importantly, much of the value of speech, and
thus the value of a larger audience, would be lost if government sanitized it to
the point of banality. Network television should prove that. Critics of
government-sponsored prayer argue that such prayers necessarily lose force
when they have to pass through government censors who attempt to make the
prayers unoffensive.58 There is no reason to think the result should be any
different for non-religious speech. Government might succeed in attracting
more shoppers to the marketplace of ideas if it mandated that every merchant
cater purely to mass tastes or beliefs, but the whole point of the marketplace is
that there be competition among antagonistic, sharply focused ideas. This
distinction, between on the one hand, simply more speech and, on the other,
competition between different ideas, and the higher value placed on the latter, is
reflected in the content-neutrality rule that is fundamental in First Amendment
jurisprudence.59
In response, it might be suggested that content-based regulation of a forum
in pursuit of attracting more listeners might still be worthwhile, as long as the
rise in listenership in some way exceeded the reduction in the diversity of ideas.
But this response is clearly inadequate. Beyond the difficulty in measuring
listenership and diversity, the fact that these two concepts are not comparable 6°
58 See,

e.g., Philip B. Kurland, The Regents' PrayerCase: 'Full of Sound and Fury,

Signifying... ' 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 30-31 (1962) (discussing concerns that nondenominational school prayers could lead to establishment of bland, watered-down, civic
religion).
59 Compare, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (applying relatively
deferential review to a speech restriction that is content-neutral), with United States v. Playboy
Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (applying strict scrutiny to a content-based restriction). Of
course, even tests for content-neutral restrictions require that the restriction leave open
alternative means of communication. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (time,
place and manner regulations); City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41 (1986)
(secondary effects regulations). However, the Court has not been particularly stringent in
applying that requirement. See, e.g., Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41, 53-54 (holding that the
requirement was met in that case even though the ordinance confined adult theaters to a land
area comprising less than five percent of the city, and even though the theaters argued that that
area contained no real estate appropriate for that use).
60 Compare Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 895, 897 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (analogizing the balancing of local benefits and burdens on interstate
commerce to the comparison of the length of a rope with the weight of a rock).
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and the inevitable slippery slope concern it raises, it is doubtful that government
should be trusted with fine-tuning the marketplace of ideas to create the
optimum mix of participation and diversity. At least this is so when the speech
to be reduced is actual speech and not, for example, arguably quasi-speech such
as campaign contributions, 61 or when the government action is a pure reduction
of speech, rather than, as in the fairness doctrine, a substitution of one type of
speech for another. Even more fundamentally, it seems doubtful that increased
access to information can ever be sufficient "compensation" for governmentmandated contraction in information diversity. The major justifications for free
speech (the search for truth, as an aid to self-government, and as an aid in selfactualization) all presuppose a diversity of viewpoints. Thus, at the extreme,
nobody would argue that the First Amendment would be well-served by a
massive government literacy program conditioned on a ban on political speech.
If this extreme version of such a tradeoff is antithetical to the First Amendment,
it is not clear why a milder version would not be.
Is there something special about children that changes the analysis?
Children are presumed incapable of choice regarding certain basic issues such
as the decision to view sexually-oriented material,62 or at least incapable of a
mature reaction to it, a maturi% that we presuppose when we demand that
speech not be forbidden adults. This immaturity is presumed to extend only
to certain types of content, thus suggesting the appropriateness, or the narrow
tailoring, of content-based restrictions on sexually-oriented expression to
children, but the unconstitutionalit of broader-based restrictions on what
information children may receive. Thus, by contrast to a situation where
government attempts to increase the size of an audience by restricting speech
that everyone has a right to hear, but which some may simply choose not to
hear, in our situation government would attempt to increase audience size by

61

See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (Stevens, J., concurring);

id. at 390-91 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring); see). See also supra text accompanying note 42.
62 See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 648-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
63 Cf., e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (holding as unprotected
speech that is calculated to provoke a response, rather than a reasoned reaction).
64 The fact that a person is a child does not mean that he has no constitutional rights,
including the right to receive information. See Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist.
v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864-65 (plurality opinion); id. at 877 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at
885, 888 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (agreeing that the right to receive ideas is a necessary
predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech but arguing that this
right does not require the government to provide that information in a particular place or
context).
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restricting speech that may be proscribable for some would-be audience
members.
This latter type of regulation is, at least in the abstract, less egregious, since
the government is restricting speech that is not constitutionally guaranteed to
everyone in order to protect those for whom the speech is considered so
harmful as to be constitutionally unprotected. Thus, the question becomes, may
government impose restrictions appropriate to an audience of children where
the effect would be to deny speech to adults? For most students of the First
Amendment, the answer is still probably "no," especially given the broad array
of protected speech that might be considered inappropriate for a child, and
which under this theory would be blocked for adults as well.65
The need to make this last choice is obviated if speech on the Internet can
be segregated in a way so that children can be blocked from receiving speech
that adults remain able to access. This article now turns to the possibility of
filtering solutions to the problem.
B. The Availability of Filtering
It is relatively easy for a parent to keep a child away from an inappropriate
movie available only on videocassette. The parent can retain the video rental
card, or can provide the child with a card that allows only the rental of certain
types of movies. Video rentals, then, are easy for a parent to filter, assuming
the existence of a ratings system that reliably tracks the material the parent
wishes to deny his child. The existence of a reliable filtering mechanism is
crucial: if such a system exists, either for video rentals or Internet usage, the
choice between opening oneself up to information and keeping undesired
speech away resolves itself; we can pick the material to which we wish to
expose ourselves or otir children. In such a case, there is no reason for
government censorship, at least on a captive audience rationale; there is no
longer captivity, as the listener gets to choose the speech to which she will be
exposed. Moreover, to the extent such filters are privately available, the need
for governmental assistance, via censorship, becomes far less compelling.
However, Internet filtering (in the sense of software that blocks a particular
computer's access to certain websites), is a very inexact science. Internet filters

65 See,

e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (sexual innuendo);

FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (profanity); Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629 (sexually
explicit magazines).
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are thought to be either over or under-inclusive, and sometimes both.66 To the
extent that filters search only text, rather than images, a large hole is created in
the reach of filters, although presumably most web pages containing offensive
images also include text for which a filter might be expected to search. This
inexactness means that the user remains confronted with the choice between
abstinence and some amount of risk of exposure to undesired speech. On the
67
other hand, such filters may screen out information that would be desired. To
complicate matters, individual users can often set filters at different levels of
restrictiveness, with different blocking results.68
Even more fundamentally, filters, to the extent they are provided by third
parties, such as an internet service provider ("ISP") or a software company,
provide only a rough approximation of the precise choices a parent might wish
to make for her child. One parent might actually prefer that a child be able to
access scientific information about the human reproductive system, or about
sexually-transmitted diseases; another parent might consider that content
unacceptable. Indeed, the same parent might consider such content appropriate
for her fourteen year-old, but not her seven-year-old. Nothing short of the
reviewing every web page her child
parent standing over the child's shoulder,
69
filtering.
precise
provides
accesses,
This second level of imprecision inheres as well in government regulation.
The Court made this point in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union. The
statute, the Court pointed out, would even have criminalized a parent's
emailing of sexually explicit information to her own child, thus obviously going
beyond the balance between a parent's preferences for the type of information
to which she would like her child exposed.
Another possibility is to filter from the other end, that is, to require that
websites engaging in regulated speech restrict access to children. The
commonly suggested method of accomplishing this is through requiring that

66 See the discussion of the precision of the most common commercially available filters in
Am. Library Assoc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002), prob.juris. noted,
123 S.67 Ct. 551 (2002).
See id. (identifying various non-offensive sites blocked by various filters); see also infra
note 69.
68
See, e.g., Kaiser Family Found., See No Evil: How InternetFiltersAffect the Searchfor
Online Health Information (visited December 16, 2002), at http://www.kff.org/content/
2002/200212 1Oa/.
69 And, of course, to the extent that the parent exercises this review by actually standing
over her child's shoulder, the child has already viewed the material and thus some harm has
been done.
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website operators obtain a credit card number or adult check password before
providing access to the regulated content. The Court in Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union pointed out that such requirements could significantly impinge
on such speech. Non-commercial speakers might find these requirements
onerous and prohibitively expensive, while even commercial website owners
might find their audiences diminished because of the delay and annoyance
involved in procuring such a password and the fact that not all web users would
have credit cards.7 °
Ultimately, wide demand for filtering raises the possibility that different
versions of filtering software will be offered, corresponding to different
parental tastes. Such private filtering could raise its own problems, particularly
with regard to the power it would provide purveyors of the filtering software
that ultimately come to dominate the market. 71 However, private filtering has
the benefit of taking the government out of the business of regulating content
and thus eliminating the most obvious constitutional concerns. Moreover, if
private demand leads to a variety of filters being offered, each different in focus
and features, the result will be an even greater scope for parental control over
what children see on the Internet, as compared with a one-size-fits-all
government regulation. Indeed, such government regulation, in addition to its
other faults, would not only fail to promote parental rights effectively, but in
fact impair those rights if the regulation failed to allow a parental override.72
Private filtering will never be perfect. Rating webpages that constantly
change and are constantly being added to the Web, and whose content must
ultimately be judged by either subjective standards or inherently inaccurate
mechanical means, is a far different enterprise than rating videotapes or even
television shows.73 At the very least, it must be conceded that for the
foreseeable future filtering will be a less-than-perfect alternative to complete
abstinence from the Internet or complete exposure to whatever evils the Internet
has to offer. Still, such private filters may be the best option in a world where
even the strongest argument for government restriction of Internet speech in the
pursuit of child protection ultimately fails.

70 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 856-57 n.23 (1997).
71See generally Balkin, supra note 43.
72

Cf., cases cited supra note 8.

73 For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in both human review and mechanical

examination of webpages, see Am. Library Ass'n. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D.
Pa. 2002).

